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Abstract
Memory is typically better for emotional relative to neutral images, an effect generally considered to be mediated by
arousal. However, this explanation cannot explain the full pattern of findings in the literature. Two experiments are reported
that investigate the differential effects of categorical affective states upon emotional memory and the contributions of
stimulus dimensions other than pleasantness and arousal to any memory advantage. In Experiment 1, disgusting images
were better remembered than equally unpleasant frightening ones, despite the disgusting images being less arousing. In
Experiment 2, regression analyses identified affective impact – a factor shown previously to influence the allocation of visual
attention and amygdala response to negative emotional images – as the strongest predictor of remembering. These
findings raise significant issues that the arousal account of emotional memory cannot readily address. The term impact
refers to an undifferentiated emotional response to a stimulus, without requiring detailed consideration of specific
dimensions of image content. We argue that ratings of impact relate to how the self is affected. The present data call for
further consideration of the theoretical specifications of the mechanisms that lead to enhanced memory for emotional
stimuli and their neural substrates.
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Introduction
Memory for emotional events is typically better than memory
for comparable non-emotional events. Memories of significant,
deeply affecting public events tend to be subjectively vivid and
long-lasting, as evidenced by the flashbulb memory phenomenon
[1]. Memory is also enhanced for emotional relative to neutral
material presented under simplified laboratory conditions, and this
effect persists over long intervals [2,3,4]. For example, increased
retention has been observed for emotional relative to neutral
narratives [5], and emotional relative to neutral pictures and
words [3,6].
The dominant theoretical account maintains that the effects of
emotion on memory are mediated by arousal, where arousal
relates to some physiological state of excitement or activation
[7,8]. Arousal theory as applied to memory is closely coupled to
wider dimensional models of the structure of emotion. Dimen-
sional theorists claim that emotional experience can be captured
by a small number of orthogonal dimensions [9,10]. The major
affective dimensions are pleasantness (often referred to as valence)
and arousal. Whereas the pleasantness dimension ranges from
negative to positive, the arousal dimension ranges from calming/
soothing to exciting/agitating. Both dimensions have been
implicated in emotional memory, though arousal has received
particular attention.
Converging evidence from both animal and human studies
supports a role for arousal in emotional memory. Animal studies
have demonstrated that increased states of arousal improve
memory [11,12,13], and that the amygdala plays an important
role in retention. Most human studies have focused on facilita-
tion of memory for arousing ‘representational’ stimuli, such as
pictures of emotional scenes or words [2,3,6]. Human studies
typically employ emotional and neutral stimuli from databases
such as the International Affective Picture Series (IAPS) [14] on
the basis of normative subjective ratings of valence and arousal
[14,15,16,17,18].
On the basis of arousal theory, it would be reasonable to predict
that increasing levels of arousal would produce corresponding
improvements in retention. This hypothesis has received support
in some studies that have varied arousal parametrically, while
keeping other stimulus attributes constant [17]. However, evidence
from multiple sources indicates that the relationship between rated
arousal and memory is not always straightforward [19]. For
example, Bradley et al. [2] divided emotional images into five
categories that ranged from highly unarousing to highly arousing;
only highly arousing images produced significantly enhanced
memory. Counterintuitive findings have also emerged in younger
adults [20], where memory was enhanced for low relative to high
arousal negative items. The authors entertained the possibility of a
Yerkes-Dodson type of explanation, in which memory is optimum
at moderate levels of arousal but reduced at lower or higher
arousal levels. However, in a review of the literature, Christianson
[21] reported little evidence for the application of the Yerkes-
Dodson law to emotional memory.
The emphasis on arousal and valence dimensions within the
emotional memory literature has inevitably drawn attention away
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emotion categories postulated by Darwin [22] and others
[23,24,25,26,27], or indeed, correlates of these categories. A
comprehensive review of the literature on emotional memory
concluded that findings have been severely limited by the
consideration of emotion as ‘merely arousal’, and that a more
complete understanding will result only from considering the
contributions made by categorical affective states, as well as
attributes linked to cognitive appraisal [7].
Though there is variation according to the particular taxonomy,
basic emotions have included disgust, fear, anger, happiness,
sadness, and surprise. Some of these have very similar profiles in
the dimensional model, but nonetheless distinct qualities, and in
some cases, distinct neural bases [28]. Fear and disgust are of
particular significance for evaluating the effects of arousal as
neurophysiological evidence indicates that the two are associated
with partially distinct neural substrates [28,29]. Furthermore,
psychophysiological evidence and behavioural ratings indicate that
fear is a high arousal unpleasant emotion, whereas disgust is a
moderate arousal unpleasant emotion [30], or certainly no more
arousing than fear.
If arousal is causal, then a straightforward prediction would be
that memory for disgusting stimuli should be worse, or certainly no
better than memory for frightening stimuli of equal unpleasant-
ness. However, there are reasons to suppose that this might not be
the case. Charash & McKay [31] failed to find a recall advantage
for fearful words, reporting a recall advantage for disgusting over
frightening words instead. The conclusions drawn from that study
were not entirely persuasive as the disgust, threat, and neutral
word lists were matched for word frequencies but not for affective
variables such as pleasantness and arousal. Nevertheless, addi-
tional research has shown that another factor known to influence
recollection – attention to the to-be-remembered material at
encoding [32,33,34] – is associated to a greater extent with disgust
than with fear-related stimuli. Relative to frightening stimuli,
disgusting stimuli more readily engage interest and attention
during the first 500 ms of viewing, demonstrated using eye-
tracking methodology [35].
Another key issue in the emotional memory literature surrounds
the extent to which emotion has dissociable influences on distinct
memory processes. In an elegant study, Ochsner [17] employed
the Remember/Know paradigm to study recognition memory for
pictorial emotional stimuli. The term remembering refers to a
positive recognition response that is accompanied by recollection
of the encoding context, such as thoughts, feelings, and sensory
details that were experienced when the stimulus was first
presented. The term knowing, on the other hand, refers to a
positive recognition response that is associated with the knowledge
that the stimulus is familiar and has been seen before but without
any recollection of the episodic context. Whereas previous
research had shown that highly arousing or highly negative or
positive materials are better retained than neutral ones [2],
Ochsner [17] demonstrated that these effects are most apparent
for measures of recollection rather than familiarity, and that both
pleasantness and arousal have significant, independent effects on
recollection.
Given that investigations of emotional memory will benefit from
consideration of categorical affective states, it seemed important to
revisit this topic using well-controlled stimuli. The current research
compared memory for images of equally negative disgusting and
frightening scenes; this addressed the role of arousal directly, as
there is reason to expect that lower-arousal disgusting images may
be better recollected than higher-arousal frightening ones. In
addition to matching the two image sets for pleasantness, it was
also considered important to match them for distinctiveness, as
distinctive items are often well-remembered [36,37,38] and for
visual complexity, an attribute used to match stimulus categories in
previous studies of emotional memory [17,18]. Following the lead
of Ochsner [17] and Kensinger & Corkin [6], the Remember/
Know procedure was employed to assess recognition memory and
to derive estimates of recollection- and familiarity-based memory.
On the basis of previous findings [6,17], we predicted that any
effects of emotional content would be particularly evident in
estimates of recollection for the episodic context.
Results and Discussion
Experiment 1: familiarity and recollection of disgusting
versus frightening images
Experiment 1 compared recollection and familiarity for images
of disgusting, frightening, and mildly positive scenes. The latter
were used as a control, in preference to neutral scenes, so that the
three image categories contained some emotional meaning. The
use of a positive image category as a baseline condition also
enabled us to match baseline and negative image categories on a
key content attribute, the presence of people, as most neutral
images in the IAPS feature only objects or buildings. As noted
above, the Remember/Know procedure was employed to assess
recognition memory. The dependent measures were estimates of
recollective memory, calculated from remember hits and false
alarms, and familiarity-based memory, calculated from know hits
and false alarms [39]. Our prediction was that recollection
estimates for disgusting images would be significantly greater than
for frightening ones.
A repeated-measures ANOVA on participants’ ratings of image
redness in the encoding session showed no significant effect of
image category, F (1.42, 42.72)=2.33, p.0.1 (Greenhouse-Geisser
corrected). Hence, any memory differences cannot be attributed to
differences between the stimuli on the feature judged at encoding.
Mean recollection and familiarity estimates for the disgusting,
frightening, and positive images are shown in Table 1. Proportions
of hits and false alarms for the remember and know responses are
also shown. All post hoc comparisons were Bonferroni corrected
for multiple comparisons, with corrected p values reported
throughout unless stated otherwise.
A repeated measures ANOVA examining the effects of image
category (disgusting, frightening, and positive) on recollection
estimates showed a significant main effect, F (2, 62)=15.43,
p,0.001, MSE=0.01, gp
2=0.33. Recollection estimates for
disgusting images were significantly greater than both frightening
Table 1. Mean memory scores from Experiment 1, by image
category (disgust, fear or positive).
Disgust Fear Positive
Recollection estimate 0.41 (0.20) 0.31 (0.20) 0.25 (0.18)
Familiarity estimate (fd9) 1.37 (0.76) 0.85 (0.73) 1.13 (0.74)
Remember hits 0.43 (0.20) 0.35 (0.20) 0.28 (0.18)
Remember false alarms 0.04 (0.06) 0.05 (0.08) 0.04 (0.08)
Know hits 0.30 (0.19) 0.27 (0.14) 0.35 (0.14)
Know false alarms 0.08 (0.10) 0.13 (0.09) 0.10 (0.11)
Standard deviations are shown in brackets. There was a significant recollection
advantage for disgusting images compared to the other categories (p’s,0.005),
and a parallel effect for familiarity estimates.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0026571.t001
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(31)=4.86, p,0.005, d=0.84. The difference in recollection
estimates between frightening and positive image categories was
not statistically significant, p=0.09.
Familiarity estimates data were submitted to an identical
ANOVA. The effect of image category was significant, F (2,
62)=6.85 MSE=0.31, p,0.001, gp
2=0.19, reflecting higher fd9
scores for disgusting relative to frightening images, t (31)=3.79,
p,0.005, d=0.70. No other comparisons were significant
(p.0.10).
The findings are consistent with recent results indicating that
disgusting images preferentially attract attention when presented
simultaneously with frightening images [35]. They also indicate
that the previous advantage for disgust-related words [31] in a
recall memory experiment extends and generalises to recollection
and familiarity estimates for disgusting images that are matched
carefully with frightening images for pleasantness, approach-
avoidance, distinctiveness, visual complexity, anger and sadness.
Perhaps most importantly, the current findings of increased
memory for disgusting relative to frightening images raise
questions about accounts of emotional memory effects that rely
on arousal as the primary explanatory factor. The disgusting
images were rated as significantly less arousing than the frightening
images, and although this difference was small, the arousal
account would certainly not predict improved recognition memory
for disgust relative to fear images. Similarly, increased memory
was observed for the disgusting relative to positive control images,
even though these two stimulus categories were matched for rated
arousal. Thus, under circumstances where tightly controlled
materials were employed, the predictions of the theory linking
arousal and memory were not supported.
The memory advantage for disgusting relative to frightening
images was found for both recollection and familiarity. By
contrast, previous work has shown the influence of pleasantness
and arousal on emotional memory to be primarily on recollection
estimates [17]. In addition, whereas Ochsner [17] found that
negative images were recollected more readily than positive
images, Experiment 1 found that the negative image advantage
was greater for disgusting than for frightening images, despite both
image sets being matched for pleasantness, and negative valence in
particular. Thus, the memory advantage for disgusting images
cannot be attributed to variation in this dimension either and must
instead derive from attributes other than valence and arousal.
Our data so far suggest that not all arousing images have a
strong enough effect upon participants to result in significantly
increased recollection relative to carefully-controlled stimulus sets;
therefore factors other than arousal and valence need to be
identified and integrated into causal accounts of emotional
memory. This idea is consistent with the results of a recent review
of the emotional memory literature [7] in which the contributions
of categorical affective states (e.g. basic emotions) and attributes
based in cognitive appraisal theory were considered essential to an
understanding of emotional memory. It has been similarly
suggested that emotional stimuli engage semantic information
and appraisal processes [17] as well as incorporate non-emotional
attributes [40] that could affect memory in ways that remain to be
investigated. Experiment 2 explored dimensions other than
valence and arousal that might account for the enhanced retention
of disgusting images.
Experiment 2: exploring dimensions that may account for
enhanced memory of emotional images
It is possible that our disgusting stimuli were more memorable
simply because they related to disgust. Another possibility is that
our disgusting images might have been more memorable because
they weigh particularly heavily on psychological attributes or
processes that facilitate retention – these attributes or processes
would not be considered to be specific to the emotion disgust, but
to also contribute to the memory advantage observed for
emotional stimuli more generally.
Memory researchers and appraisal theorists have suggested a
range of plausible influences on memorability. Together, they
have identified a range of attributes that are important in the
generation of varied emotional experiences and reactions [41].
These include, but are not limited to, salience, thematic relevance
to the self, incongruity, meaningfulness, and importance. Given
the presence of strong correlations between at least some of these
factors, notably importance (i.e. consequentiality), meaningfulness
and memorability [42], what the constructs share is plausibly more
significant than the specifics of the individual dimensions
identified.
We have previously argued that attributes such as those
identified as important in the generation of emotional experience,
may contribute, individually or collectively, to a factor that has
been the focus of recent empirical investigations – the immediate
impact an item has on an individual [43,44]. The term impact
derives from photojournalism where it is used to describe powerful
and striking images [45]. In recent behavioural and neuroimaging
studies, impact has been shown to influence the allocation of visual
attention [44] and also the amygdala response [43] to negative
emotional images, to high versus low impact image sets that have
been carefully matched on a number of stimulus attributes,
including arousal and valence. These studies argued that ratings of
impact reflect an individual’s undifferentiated reaction to the
image and thus index the immediate significance or relevance of a
stimulus for the self. Given that increasing or dividing attention to
encoded information is known to lead to enhanced and reduced
remembering, respectively [32,34,46] and that the amygdala is a
brain structure known to be important for emotional memory
[47,48,49,50,51,52], it follows that ratings of impact may be a
strong predictor of emotional memory in the present study.
A preliminary visual inspection of the most and least frequently
remembered images across our image categories suggested that the
former did indeed have immediate and strong effects upon the
viewer, providing some initial support for this idea. This effect was
not limited to the disgusting images, however, as several
frightening images that were frequently remembered also
appeared to share this eye-catching quality. As noted above, the
impact of these images upon the viewer could relate to a number
of different factors such as the extent to which the images were
incongruent with participants’ previous experience, such that their
meaning or significance was in one way or another difficult to
grasp. One example is a picture of a man kissing the side of a
woman’s head. The woman is bruised and bloodied and appears
to be unconscious or dead. It is unlikely that participants would
have seen an image like this previously. Thus, the image as a whole
is incongruous with previous experience, makes a strong
impression, and is consequently, well-remembered.
The purpose of Experiment 2 was to determine which attributes
are the strongest predictors of the emotional memory effects
observed in Experiment 1 by having participants rate the stimuli
on a number of dimensions. To explore the contribution of
impact, identified in previous research as a key determinant of
heightened attention and amygdala response to negative emotion-
al images, we employed an impact rating scale; this scale captured
participants’ undifferentiated response to images as indexed by the
immediate impact these images had upon the participant. In the
Introduction we noted that ratings of arousal may relate to some
Recollection of Disgust and Fear Images
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ratings of impact may likewise have a physiological basis, we also
included ratings of participants’ negative and positive body state
reactions to the images. Both Tulving [53] and Gardiner [54,55]
have argued that remember responses are often based on
remembered thoughts and feelings. To assess this sort of
elaborative processing, we included a fourth rating scale that
indexed the number of thoughts and ideas evoked by the content
of each image. These four new ratings (impact, negative and
positive body state reactions, and ideation) supplemented our
earlier ones (arousal, pleasantness, approach-avoidance, distinc-
tiveness, and visual complexity) to enable us to determine which
factors best predict picture recognition. The prediction was that
images that were frequently remembered in Experiment 1 would
be rated high in impact by this separate group of participants and
that ratings of body state and ideation might relate to judgements
of impact.
A summary of mean ratings, and Mann-Whitney comparisons
between the three image categories employed, is shown in Table 2.
It was not considered appropriate to calculate recollection
estimates in an items analysis as different participants contributed
remember hits and remember false alarms. Instead, stepwise
multiple regression analyses were conducted to isolate the variables
that predicted remember hit rates. Indeed, in Experiment 1, the
correlation between recollection estimates and remember hit rates
was extremely high, r (32)=0.97, p,0.001. The predictors entered
into the multiple regressions included the four personal reaction
ratings (impact, negative and positive body state reactions, and
ideation), and also the five previously collected ratings (arousal,
pleasantness, approach-avoidance, distinctiveness, and visual
complexity).
Across the disgusting, frightening and positive images, the best
regression model had an AdjR
2 of 0.30, F (2, 105)=22.00,
p,0.001. There were two significant predictors of remember hit
rates: impact (beta=0.33, p,0.001) and distinctiveness (be-
ta=0.26, p,0.05). However, when only the negative (disgusting
and frightening) images were included in a similar analysis, impact
was the only predictor: this model had an AdjR
2 of 0.32, F (1,
70)=33.53, p,0.001. Impact was a highly significant predictor,
with a beta of 0.57, p,0.001. The latter analysis therefore suggests
that the contribution of distinctiveness to remembering was
attributable to the inclusion of the less distinctive (and less well
remembered) positive images.
Crucially, arousal ratings did not emerge as a predictor of
remembering. This suggests that the memory effects attributed to
differences in arousal ratings in previous investigations [2,17] may
in fact have resulted from other factors.
Further stepwise multiple regressions were conducted to
discover what image characteristics were the strongest predictors
of impact ratings. A first analysis examined the disgusting,
frightening and positive images. The independent variables
specified above were entered, with the exception of impact, which
constituted the dependent variable. The resultant model was
highly significant, AdjR
2=0.64, F (4, 103)=48.40, p,0.001, and
revealed that four aspects of the Experiment 1 images were
important contributors to their impact level. Negative body state
reaction was the strongest predictor of impact (beta=1.07,
t=7.20, p,0.001), followed by positive body state reaction
(beta=0.57, t=4.41, p,0.001) and distinctiveness (beta=0.29,
t=0.29, t=3.59, p,0.005). The fourth predictor in this model was
ideation, and this rating was the only negative predictor of impact
(beta=20.16, t=22.28, p,0.05). A similar multiple regression
for disgust and fear images alone showed an AdjR
2 of 0.57, F (3,
68)=32.83, p,0.001. The predictors were negative body state
reaction ratings (beta=0.57), distinctiveness (beta=0.42), and
ideation (beta=20.21), p’s,0.05. Thus, the contribution of
positive body state reaction to the previous model reflected the
inclusion of positive images.
Arousal was not identified as a significant predictor in any of the
regression models. Thus, arousal, conceived by many dimensional
theorists as an ‘‘excitement’’ dimension and associated with
physiological arousal, does not fully capture either the affective
properties of emotional memory or the conceptual basis of impact.
Importantly, the multiple regression analysis does not discount
some association between arousal and impact; indeed, impact was
found to significantly correlate with arousal, r (108)=0.45,
p,0.001. Rather, it shows that image properties other than
arousal are more important in determining impact.
General Discussion
The goal of this research was to examine the influence of
disgusting versus frightening negative emotional images on
recognition memory and to explore factors that contribute to
heightened recollection. The results of Experiment 1 indicated
that disgusting scenes were retained to a greater extent than
images of equally unpleasant frightening scenes, with larger
recollection estimates calculated for disgusting scenes. Importantly,
this pattern emerged even though the disgusting images were rated
as less arousing than the frightening ones but were otherwise
matched for unpleasantness, distinctiveness, visual complexity, and
other stimulus attributes. In Experiment 2, multiple regression
analyses showed that improved recollection was best accounted for
by differences in the immediate impact of the images, and not
differences in arousal or pleasantness.
Table 2. Mann Whitney U tests on Personal Reaction ratings for the Experiment 1 image categories.
Disgust Fear Positive Disgust vs. Fear Disgust vs. Pos Fear vs. Pos
Mean (SD) Mann-Whitney U (z)
Impact 5.68 (1.81) 4.49 (1.34) 2.90 (1.26) 395.00 (22.87)* 141.00 (25.73)*** 259.00 (24.41)***
Neg. body state 6.36 (1.87) 6.00 (1.25) 1.03 (0.12) 534.50 (21.29) NS 0.00 (27.72)*** 0.00 (27.73)***
Pos. body state 1.01 (0.08) 1.11 (0.30) 6.39 (1.27) 574.50 (21.73) NS 0.00 (27.77)*** 0.00 (27.62)***
Ideation 3.49 (1.28) 3.72 (1.08) 3.50 (0.82) 561.50 (20.99) NS 616.00 (20.37) NS 580.00 (20.78) NS
Bonferroni corrected, asymptotic two-tailed significance levels are denoted as follows:
***p,0.005;
**p,0.01,
*p,0.05.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0026571.t002
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images may derive from attributes other than valence and arousal,
dimensions that feature prominently in the emotion memory
literature [17,40,56]. Contrary to the widely held view that arousal
in particular is a major determinant of emotional memory effects,
the present data suggest that a construct that we refer to as
‘impact’ may offer a more adequate explanation. A role for impact
aligns with our previous work showing that impact influences the
allocation of visual attention to negative emotional images [44], as
increased attention to encoded information is known to enhance
recollection [32] whereas divided attention is known to reduce
recollection [34,46]. It is furthermore consistent with research
showing a heightened amygdala response to high versus low
impact negative images [43], as both lesion and functional
neuroimaging studies [47,48,49,50,51,52] have demonstrated that
the amygdala plays a central role in emotional memory. The
current findings also correspond with research showing that
adolescents’ and adults’ appraised impact of the September 11
th US
attacks predicted recalled intensity of sadness, anger, and anxiety,
changes in memory for these emotions over time, and symptoms of
post-traumatic stress [57].
Participants’ ratings of impact indicated the extent to which
they were affected by the images, that is, how much they felt the
image content created an instant impact on them personally. Our
procedure for rating impact used short presentation durations, and
the instructions emphasized immediate judgments based on
generic senses or feelings [58] without deconstruction of their
elements. In previous work [43,44], we have argued that impact
ratings index participants’ undifferentiated emotional response to a
stimulus, without requiring more detailed consideration of specific
dimensions of image content. To illustrate, an individual might
have an undifferentiated ‘Yuk’ or ‘What the …?’ reaction to a
specific image, without explicit consideration of how disgusting or
arousing that image might be.
This is relevant to a distinction that has been drawn between
emotional images inducing a genuine emotional reaction (e.g.,
making you feel ‘sick to your stomach’), and those being coldly
appraised as having ‘affective quality’ (e.g. a cold evaluation that an
image depicts a nauseating scene)[58].Itis possiblethat arousal and
pleasantness ratings failed to predict memory well because these
ratings can be more readily made on the basis of intellectually-
detached judgments of affective qualities. In contrast, rated impact
may have been a stronger predictor because it relies on some degree
of personally felt core affect, however fleetingly invoked in a labora-
torysetting. Rusell [10] has defined core affect as a neurophysiological
state that is ‘consciously accessible as a simple, nonreflective feeling
that is an integral blend of hedonic and arousal values’. Insofar as
ratings of impact were designed to quantify a genuine emotional
response, it is noteworthy that negative body state reactions were
prominent in the regression analysis of impact ratings. Arousal, on
the other hand, was not. This indicates that the impact ratings are
capturing at least some qualitative attributes of visceral, and
potentially other bodily reactions that are missed by assessments of
arousal in the current study. The observed involvement of negative
body state reactions is not unexpected as it is consistent with
theoretical work proposing that disgust is an emotion that evolved
fromamoreprimitivesysteminvolvedindistaste[59].Indeed,ithas
been suggested that disgust is often experienced as a visceral
sensation, and that this is likely to be due to the processes of nausea,
throat clenching, and food expulsion that are often triggered by this
emotion [60]. Schnall and colleagues [60] further suggest that
whereas emotions typically involve a physical and embodied
component, this feature may be particularly pronounced for the
emotion disgust.
Though impact ratings were designed to assess the immediate
emotional effects of the image upon the viewer rather than an
intrinsic property of the image, these ratings are likely to
incorporate and be influenced by attributes identified by appraisal
theorists as important in the generation of emotional reactions and
responses [41]. These include attributes such as the immediate
significance or relevance of a stimulus for the self, and
distinctiveness or incongruity. Relevance to the self relates to
constructs such as core affect, discussed above, and the ‘‘working
model of the self’’ [61] or ‘‘schematic model of the self’’ [62]
discussed in relation to autobiographical recollection and Re-
member/Know performance in sad mood states, respectively.
Personal relevance is known to contribute to flashbulb memory
formation in the case of emotionally-charged public events [1],
and influences whether an event is remembered rather than
known [63]. Interestingly, though Ochsner [17] found a
recollection advantage for negative relative to positive images
matched for arousal, he noted that this advantage might have been
lost had the two image sets been equated for ‘personal relevance.’
Furthermore, Adolphs [64] has argued that ‘constructs such as
impact and relevance’ should form the basis for investigating
individual differences in amygdala function. This interpretation
accords with Ewbank’s conclusion that amygdala function is
determined not simply by arousal (or valence) alone but by an
event’s significance or relevance to the individual [43].
Further relevant to the current research is the contribution of
distinctiveness to rated impact and estimates of recollection.
Though the memory advantage for disgusting relative to fearful
stimuli emerged despite these stimulus sets being matched for
distinctiveness, after body state reactions, distinctiveness was a
second predictor of impact ratings. As operationalised in our
study, items can be distinctive on the basis of semantic through to
perceptual levels of analysis. Thus, images having impact seem to
involve an intersection between felt affect and more traditional
cognitive attributes associated with what makes events distinct,
such as rareness or incongruity with prior experience. In the
literature examining memory for non-emotional and emotional
items, distinctive items tend to be remembered or recalled more
often than less distinctive items [36,37,38]. It is important to
emphasise that distinctiveness is not equivalent to visual complex-
ity, which has been used to match stimulus categories in previous
studies of emotional memory [17,18] but did not emerge as a
significant predictor of impact or recollection here.
The present findings demonstrate that disgusting images may
be better remembered than equally pleasant frightening ones that
are matched for a range of emotional and non-emotional stimulus
attributes, despite the disgusting images being less arousing.
Neither arousal- nor valence-based accounts of emotional
memory can readily account for this finding, with the construct
of impact instead emerging as a strong predictor of the current
emotional memory effects. Previous work has shown that impact
influences the allocation of visual attention and the amygdala
response to negative emotional images, yet important issues
remain to be addressed. One obvious application of the present
findings would be to assess memory for well-controlled stimuli
that vary in rated impact, while another would be to assess
whether impact’s explanatory power extends to memory for
highly positive images and stimuli in other modalities. The
present contribution of rated body state, distinctiveness and (lack
of) ideation to impact further suggests promise in clarification of
the factor structure that underlies diverse ratings of image
content. In the case of the bodily state reactions to high impact
images, examination of psychophysiological indices should also
be prioritised.
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that regression analyses were conducted using memory data and
stimulus ratings collected from separate samples of participants.
Memory was not tested in Experiment 2 because multiple viewings
and ratings might have biased recollection even two weeks later.
Though the current data leave open the issue of whether
participants’ own ratings would predict memory in a way similar
to that described here, previous research has reported that for
rated impact, consistency of ratings across participants is highly
significant [43,44]. It would therefore not be unreasonable to
expect a similar pattern of findings if both datasets had been
drawn from the same sample of participants.
Overall, our findings are consistent with the idea that the extant
research on emotional memory has been constrained by its
treatment of emotion as merely arousal. They demonstrate that a
more complete understanding will only result from systematic
consideration of the contributions made by categorical affective
states (e.g. basic emotions) and other stimulus and event attributes
linked to cognitive appraisal [7]. More specifically, the present
research suggests a role for the appraised impact of emotional
images. While the concept of impact has not been evaluated in
experimental memory research, it has played a key role in artistic
discourse. A carefully-crafted media photograph should be
indelible over long periods, and in photojournalism, striking and
eye-catching visual images are routinely referred to as images with
impact [45].
Methods
Experiment 1
This research was approved by the University of Cambridge
Psychology Research Ethics Committee and was conducted
according to principles expressed in the Declaration of Helsinki.
Participants. Participants gave informed written consent
before participating. Thirty-two community volunteers (twenty-five
females; mean age=35.2, SD=7.9) participated in exchange for a
small honorarium. All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Stimuli. The stimulus set comprised 36 disgusting, 36
frightening, and 36 positive 72 dpi colour photographic images.
Images were selected on the basis of ratings from a larger set of
208 images, the majority of which were taken from the
International Affective Picture System (IAPS) [14]. All images
had been rated previously for five basic emotions (disgust, fear,
happiness, anger and sadness) and five additional variables
(pleasantness, arousal, tendency to approach or avoid,
distinctiveness, and visual complexity). The instructions had
emphasized that participants should rate the images on the basis
of their own personal reactions rather than how people in general
should feel. The ratings on these other dimensions made use of
well-established scales. The instructions for rating pleasantness and
arousal were described according to the descriptions in the IAPS
manual [14]; approach-avoidance was rated with endpoints very
inclined to approach the scene to very inclined to avoid the scene;
distinctiveness was rated on the basis of how rarely similar
scenes are encountered, relative to other scenes or images, in
everyday life; and visual complexity instructions were adapted
from Ochsner [17]. More specifically, an image could be
considered complex either because it had many simple objects
that each had little detail, or a few objects that each had a lot of
detail. Lower scores on the 9-point likert scales indicated
unpleasant, low arousal, high approach, indistinctive, and low
visual complexity image qualities.
The mean ratings for the three image categories employed in
Experiment 1 are given in Table 3. Mann-Whitney comparisons
showed that the frightening images were rated as more frightening
than the other two categories, the disgusting images as more
disgusting, and the positive images as more pleasant. Frightening
images were also rated as the most arousing, whereas disgusting
and positive images did not differ on arousal ratings. Disgusting
and frightening images were matched on the following other
dimensions: pleasantness, approach-avoidance, distinctiveness,
visual complexity, anger and sadness. The stimuli were further
divided into two closely matched study sets (set one and set two) on
the basis of their content and ratings, each consisting of 18 images
belonging to each emotion category. Participants viewed one study
set in the encoding session, while the other set served as foils for
the recognition memory test. Sixteen mildly unpleasant filler
images were also included to minimize primacy and recency
effects.
Design. The independent variable was image category
(disgusting, frightening, and positive images; repeated measure).
The experiment consisted of an encoding session and a test session
separated by an interval of approximately two weeks (mean
interval=13.75 days, SD=1.02). Half of the participants were
shown study set one as targets while study set two served as foils in
the test session; for the other half of participants the target and foil
sets were reversed. The dependent variables in the test session
were the proportions of remember, know and new responses made
to targets and foils from each image category. These responses
were converted into recollection and familiarity (fd9) estimates,
using the equations shown in Appendix S1.
Procedure. The images were presented on a VDU using
PsyScope [65]. They were presented against a black background,
and subtended a vertical visual angle of approximately 15u and a
horizontal visual angle of approximately 13u.
In the encoding session, participants were presented with 18
disgusting, 18 frightening, and 18 positive images from stimulus
set one or set two. Images were shown in one of four
pseudorandom orders for each stimulus set across three
counterbalanced blocks, such that no more than three images
from the same emotion category were shown consecutively. To
minimize primacy and recency effects, eight filler images were
presented at the beginning and end of the encoding session. On
each trial, a fixation cross was presented for 500 ms, followed
after a 500 ms inter-stimulus interval (ISI) by an image displayed
for 5000 ms. Participants were instructed to rate each image for
how much red it contained, and to do this from the perspective of
a picture editor of a journal, because red did not reproduce well
at the printers. This served to focus attention on each image,
without requiring any in-depth processing of their emotional or
semantic content. Participants were not aware that their memory
would be tested when they returned approximately two weeks
later for the test session.
In the test session, participants were initially trained in the
Remember/Know distinction, with a procedure adapted from
Gardiner, Ramponi and Richardson-Klavehn [66]. They were
asked to indicate using a button box whether the image had been
presented in the encoding session and they could recollect details
about the context in which it had been presented (‘‘remember’’),
or whether the image seemed familiar but they could not recollect
anything about the context in which the image had been presented
at encoding (‘‘know’’), or whether the image had not been
presented at encoding (‘‘new’’). Guessing was strongly discour-
aged. Participants viewed images from the study set intermixed
with images from the image set that was not presented at encoding
(foils). Each image remained on the screen until the participant
made their response. Images were presented in four pseudoran-
dom blocks whose order was counterbalanced across participants.
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Participants, design, and procedure. A new group of 12
participants (8 women; mean age 31.50 years, SD=6.37) rated the
full set of 208 images from which the Experiment 1 images had
been selected, for four variables – impact, negative body state
reaction, positive body state reaction, and ideation. The images
were presented on a VDU, in the same way as the encoding
session of Experiment 1. The instructions emphasized that
participants should rate the images on the basis of their own
personal reactions rather than how they imagined people in
general should feel. All participants first rated the images for their
immediate impact following a short (500 ms) presentation on a
scale that ranged from 1 (no impact) to 9 (intensive impact).
Following Murphy et al. [44], participants were instructed to
consider each picture as a whole and judge whether they felt the
content of the image created an instant sense of impact on them
personally. They were asked not to think in detail about the
picture or its contents in terms of particular properties like the
positive or negative feelings it might invoke (e.g. joy, anger, etc.),
how distinctive the image was or how many thoughts and ideas it
led to.
The instructions for rating impact were as follows: ‘‘In this
experiment you will view a series of pictures with varying
content. Each will be presented only for a very short amount of
time – this is because we want you to rate each one for its
immediate impact. By this we mean that before you get to think
about what is in the picture you may be instantly affected by it –
without necessarily knowing why. We would like you to consider
each picture as a whole. Just judge whether you feel the content
of the image created an instant sense of impact on you
personally. Try not to think in detail about the picture or its
contents in terms of particular properties like the particular
positive or negative feelings it might invoke in you (e.g. fear,
anger, joy, etc.), how distinctive the image is or how many
thoughts and ideas it leads to. We just want an estimate of its
overall immediate impact, irrespective of what it is that might
underlie its impact on you personally (i.e. whether it’s positive,
negative or neither). Remember, it is your own personal reaction
we are interested in, not how you think people in general should
feel. Just glance at the picture and make an ‘instant’ judgment.’’
No participant reported difficulty with understanding the impact
rating instructions, and importantly, a high level of agreement in
impact ratings across participants has been reported previously
[43].
Following the impact rating task, the images were viewed again,
this time for 5000 ms each, in a different order, and each image
was then rated for (1) negative body state reaction, (2) positive
body state reaction, and (3) ideation (the number of elicited
thoughts and ideas). The order of the scales was counterbalanced.
The former two contrast with pleasantness ratings by emphasising
genuine visceral and emotional feelings, as opposed to cold
rational appraisals. For negative body state reaction, participants
were asked to indicate the extent to which each scene caused a
negative body state reaction such as an unpleasant feeling in the
pit of their stomach, shivers up their spine, or hairs on the back of
their neck standing on end. For positive body state reaction,
participants were asked to indicate the extent to which each scene
caused a positive body state reaction such as feeling warm inside,
wanting to laugh out loud, or feeling so happy that they might cry.
Ratings of negative and positive body state reactions were done on
9-point scales with endpoints 1 no negative/positive body state reaction to
9 very high negative/positive body state reaction. For ideation, participants
were asked to rate how many thoughts and ideas came to mind for
each image on a scale with endpoints (1 none at all and 9 a large
number of ideas).
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Table 3. Mann-Whitney U tests, comparing ratings on the Experiment 1 image categories.
Disgust Fear Positive Disgust vs. Fear Disgust vs. Pos Fear vs. Pos
Mean (SD) Mann-Whitney U (z)
Disgust 4.65 (1.48) 1.58 (1.33) 1.00 (0.00) 44.00 (26.96)*** 0.00 (27.83)*** 414.00 (23.94)***
Fear 1.24 (0.63) 5.14 (1.18) 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (27.57)*** 522.00 (22.76)* 0.00 (27.84)***
Happiness 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 6.12 (0.93) 648.00 (0.00) NS 0.00 (27.88)*** 0.00 (27.88)***
Anger 2.02 (1.66) 1.69 (1.10) 1.00 (0.00) 631.00 (20.22) NS 432.00 (23.75)*** 396.00 (24.11)***
Sadness 2.46 (2.17) 2.23 (1.75) 1.00 (0.00) 626.00 (20.29) NS 396.00 (24.11)*** 414.00 (23.93)***
Arousal 4.12 (1.34) 4.86 (1.09) 4.08 (0.92) 382.50 (23.02)** 589.00 (20.67) NS 346.50 (23.44)***
Pleasantness 1.97 (0.68) 2.01 (0.59) 7.51 (0.72) 591.50 (20.70) NS 0.00 (27.40)*** 0.00 (27.47)***
Approach/avoidance 7.08 (1.07) 7.54 (0.78) 2.52 (0.98) 456.00 (22.23) NS 3.00 (27.32)*** 0.00 (27.36)***
Distinctiveness 5.26 (1.91) 5.47 (1.46) 3.38 (1.31) 585.00 (20.72) NS 285.00 (24.12)*** 192.50 (25.18)***
Vis. Complexity 4.15 (1.28) 3.85 (1.36) 4.08 (1.02) 581.00 (20.76) NS 637.00 (20.13) NS 583.00 (20.74) NS
Bonferroni corrected, asymptotic two-tailed significance levels are denoted as follows:
***p,0.005;
**p,0.01,
*p,0.05.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0026571.t003
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